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sociology, to law reviews and bar journals. In 1954-55 he was a
Fulbright Lecturer and gave a series of lectures in the United Kingdom. The Department of State assigned him to duties in the Far East
and specifically to the Korean Legal Institute. He has emphasized
and stimulated the study of legal philosophy and jurisprudence in
the United States. For several years he served as Chairman of the
Editorial Committee of the Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy
Series. This series includes seven volumes of translated material
and articles written by the leading jurists of the world. Mr. Hall has
an international reputation as a scholar. He has professional respect
and love for this University. For his scholarly attainment, his
sterling character and his penetrating grasp of the infinite complexities of our legal institutions, I deem it a privilege to recommend
on behalf of the University Council, that the degree of Doctor of
Laws, honoris causa, be conferred upon our former colleague,
Jerome Hall.
0. H. THORMODSGARD, Dean

DISTRICT COURT DIGESTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE-THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT FOR CONTRIBUTION NOT IMPOSABLE BY EMPLOYER IN ACTION
BY EMPLOYEE UNDER TERMS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.-Schindler v. Clark Transport Co., District Court
of the Second Judicial District, Rolette County, North Dakota,
Albert Lundberg, District Judge.
On February 20, 1957, a collision occurred between a truck
owned by defendant Clark Transport Co. (hereinafter "Clark")
and an automobile driven by Fagerlund. The plaintiff Schindler
was a passenger in the Fagerlund automobile. Schindler was empolyed by Fagerlund in employment covered by the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Act, and at the time of the accident was
concededly in the course of his employment. Injured in the accident, Schindler brought an action for damages against Clark and
against one Wilken, the driver of the Clark truck. Clark and Wilken
in turn impleaded Fagerlund as a third-party defendant, their
third-party complaint alleging that the accident resulted solely
from the negligence of Fagerlund. Fagerlund filed a third-party
answer denying this allegation. Thereafter the plaintiff Schindler
and the third-party defendant Fagerlund joined in a motion to
dismiss the third-party proceeding on the ground it was not permissible under N.D.R.Civ.P. 14. In support of this motion they
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argued that the accident occurred prior to the effective date of the
Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act in North Dakota
and hence that Fagerlund was not liable to make contribution to
the defendants; and further, that Fagerlund could not conceivably
be liable to Schindler for any injuries, since as an employee injured in the course of his employment Schindler had no right of
action against his employer for negligence and was restricted
to recovery under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Since Schindler had no claim against Fagerlund, it was asserted,
the defendants could not recover from Fagerlund on the theory they
were subrogated to Schindler's claim; nor could they assert a right
to indemnification from Fagerlund. In opposition to the motion
it was argued (1) that the motion asserted affirmative defenses
to the third-party proceeding which had not been pleaded in the
third-party answer, and hence violated N.D.R.Civ.P. 8(c);
(2) that the motion came too late to be timely under the provisions
of N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b); and (3) that if the defendants could show
that Fagerlund had the last clear chance to avoid the accident,
then Fagerlund would be solely liable and if defendants were
obliged to pay damages to Schindler they should be permitted to
reimburse or indemnify themselves from Fagerlund "under some
principle of law or equity not coming within our recently enacted
statute allowing contribution."
On the issues of raising affirmative defenses not pleaded in the
third--party answer and timeliness, the district court ruled in favor
of the motion. It was pointed out that an application of the Rules
of Civil Procedure in the fashion contended for by the third-party
plaintiffs would merely result in forcing the third-party defendant to
amend his answer to tender to the court the precise issues already
raised by the motion. The court thought this would be.merely a
formality. "To rule out some important facts admitted to exist, because of the failure of a party to plead them in another part of the
proceedings, would, it seems to us, tend to defeat the purpose and
spirit of the Rules."
On the issue of the third-party plaintiffs' right to reimbursement
or indemnity from the third-party defendant, the court found "a
more complex and technical situation." Proof that Fagerlund's
alleged negligence had been the sole proximate cause of the accident would be a defense to Schindler's action against Clark and
Wilken. But in Bolton v. Donovan, 9 N.D. 575, 84 N.W. 357 (1900),
it was held that "the remedy for a defendant who felt that a third
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party was really to blame for the injuries for which he, the defendant- was being sued, was not to drag in said third party but to
show in his own trial as a defense that such third party was to
blame."
The court could find no authority for the contention that the
"last clear chance" doctrine was available to anyone save a plaintiff accused of contributory negligence. Nor did a right of contribution exist as between the third-party plaintiffs and the third-party
defendant, because the accident occurred prior to the enactment of
the statute allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors. "Nor can
we find anything under the headings of indemnity or-subrogation
to support counsel's argument."
The motion was accordingly granted.
CIVIL PROCEDURE - IMPLEADER OF THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT UNDER CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT. - Colter v. Lisakowski (John Colter, Third-Party
Defendant), District Court of the First Judicial District, Grand
Forks County, North Dakota, 0. B. Burtness, District Judge.
On February 25, 1958, the plaintiff was riding as a guest in a
motor vehicle driven by John Colter which collided with another
vehicle. driven by the defendant. Plaintiff brought an action against
the defendant who, in turn, impleaded John Colter as a third-party
defendant, alleging as a defense that Colter's negligence was the
sole proximate cause of the accident or alternatively that he was
entitled to contribution from Colter on the ground he was a joint
tortfeasor.
The plaintiff in the main action and the third-party defendant
moved for a dismissal or severance of the third-party complaint
on the ground that the right to impose a third-party complaint
was procedural only, but to permit it would disturb substantive
rights. The court then had this question to decide: May a defendant
in an action for personal injury implead a joint tortfeasor for the
purpose of asserting a right of contribution?
Judge Burtness in granting the motion to dismiss stated that our
statute conferring the right of contribution among jointtortfeasors
(N.D.Rev.Code Chapter 32-38, 1957 Supplement) is substantive
law in its entirety. Unless, therefore, the -statute -permits such impleaders of third-party defendants no such right can exist as
N.D.R.Civ.P. 14 could not change or alter substantive rights.
Rule 14 (a) permits the impleading of a third-party "who is or
may be liable to such third-party plaintiff for all or part of the
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plaintiff's claim against him." (Emphasis added.) In view of this
Judge Burtness stated, "A defendant may under such language
be brought in even though at the time it has not been judicially
determined that such third party is liable either to the plaintiff
or is liable to the defendant for contribution. However under the
rule the Court has discretion to grant any party's Motion for
'severance, separate trial, or dismissal of the third-party claim'."
"The jury trial would be greatly lengthened if the third-party
proceedings were included. It is difflcult for juries to distinguish
between ordinary actionable negligence and gross negligence and
it is not easy to prepare instructions to make them understand the
differences. While that can be overcome in cases where the
plaintiff sues both operators who are parties to a car collision ...
it becomes a different proposition where there is no actual trial
between the plaintiff and the third-party defendant and the jury
has to pass on the confusing issue of right of contribution. The
possibility of mistrial, of hung juries and of further proceedings ...
are increased and those may in turn increase, rather than decrease
the costs to the county, may increase the time devoted to the entire
proceedings by the court and may even result in the delay of
justice."
The court went on, "However, as I am holding that the rule
permits third-party proceedings in a case of this sort, I am in effect
holding that there is no distinction under our contribution statute
between joint tortfeasors and concurrent tortfeasors in spite of the
use of the words 'common liability'. In my opinion the liability is
'common' even though in a given case one party is liable for ordinary
actionable negligence and the other only for gross negligence. Of
course, both parties must be legally liable to respond in damages in
the same amount arising out of the same facts but necessarily on
identical degrees of negligence."
DIGEST OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS
HEALTH AND

SAFETY-DEFINITION

OF RESTAURANT

September 30, 1958
Section 23-0901 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 defines the word "restaurant" as "every building or other structure,
or any part thereof . . . kept, used, maintained, advertised, or
held out to the public as a place where meals or lunches are
served. . ." Section 23-0917 provides that restaurants shall pay a
license fee of two dollars and fifty cents.

